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NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD PRIORITIZE
GOVERNANCE IN BOARD SELECTION DECISIONS—
THOSE THAT PRIORITIZE MONEY MAY PAY TOO MUCH
Heidi Grunwald & Daniel Isaacs*
ABSTRACT
Non-profit corporations must comply with federal tax laws, and their
governing bodies must satisfy corporation law-based duties, but they
are not subject to the regulatory requirements of publicly traded
corporations. This discrepancy should be troubling, because the
stakeholders of non-profit organizations are far more vulnerable than
the typical investor. Accordingly, non-profit boards have a
particularly strong need for good governance. However, our research
shows that non-profit board members believe that board selection
procedures prioritize giving over the ability to attract and retain
members with attributes commonly associated with good governance.
To address this problem, we argue that laws should require non-profit
organizations to identify directors making contributions and the
amounts of those contributions, as well as certify that quality
governance is the top priority of the organizations in selecting
governing board members. To do otherwise improperly validates the
decisions of organizations to accept money in exchange for influence
at the expense of their duties to stakeholders.
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Another frequent error of non-profit boards is inviting new members
because of their marquee name within a certain field of endeavor (e.g.,
a famous dancer on the board of a dance organization) or their means
and inclination to donate, without due consideration to the person’s
ability and availability to fulfill fiduciary duties, providing the critical
oversight function. The governing body of a non-profit must be made
up entirely of people in a position to govern it—setting the strategic
direction of the organization and overseeing management’s execution
of the mission.

- Lesley Rosenthal, Counsel
Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts1

INTRODUCTION
Non-profit stakeholders deserve special protection because they
exist to serve public purposes at public expense, but they lack the power
and options held by the stockholders of for-profit corporations. Thus, it
is all the more essential that non-profits benefit from good governance.
This study was motivated by the concern that non-profits may be trading
good governance for the ability of directors to contribute funds to the
organizations. The research performed shows the non-profit leaders
surveyed report that their boards do prioritize the ability to give
financially when recruiting and retaining board members. They also
divulged that this practice negatively affects the organizations’ ability to
attract and retain diverse skillsets and engaged board members.
Compounding this troubling finding is that, in the United States, the
current disclosure regime for non-profit governance does not require
disclosure of board member contributions and does not sufficiently
require boards to prioritize governance in board selection procedures. To
begin to address this problem, the government should enact laws that
require non-profits to disclose the names of directors making
contributions and certify that quality governance is the first priority of the
organization in selecting persons to serve on its governing body. To do
1. Lesley Rosenthal, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: The Board’s Role, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 15, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2012/04/15/nonprofit-corporate-governance-the-boards-role/ [https://perma.cc/DH8XUR83].
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otherwise improperly validates the decisions of organizations to accept
money in exchange for influence at the expense of their duties to
stakeholders.
I. BACKGROUND
In the United States, publicly traded companies are subject to federal
securities laws,2 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
regulations,3 and exchange rules.4 These provisions protect the integrity
of markets, ensure that stockholders are provided with information
material to their investment decisions, and support well-developed
governance frameworks.5 Unfortunately, these regulations are largely
absent in the non-profit context.6 As Ira Millstein explained while
testifying before the U.S. Senate about the importance of non-profit
governance:
The same mechanisms by which for-profit officers and directors are
held accountable for their actions are missing in the nonprofit context.
Once a nonprofit organization receives a contribution there is no one
to hold the organization accountable for how that money is spent.
Indeed, while officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to fulfill the
mission of their organization, that mission cannot hold them

2. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry,
INVESTOR, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec/
laws-govern-securities-industry [https://perma.cc/YV3L-S3CU] (last visited Jan. 20,
2022) (identifying and describing laws that public companies must follow).
3. Rules and Regulations for the Securities and Exchange Commission and Major
Securities Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/
secrulesregs.htm [https://perma.cc/7PPX-EBY7] (last visited Jan. 20, 2022).
4. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL: SECTION 303A
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse/FAQ_NYSE_Listed_Company
_Manual_Section_303A_7_28_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL2X-HVYM] (last visited
Jan. 20, 2022).
5. See About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
about.shtml [https://perma.cc/HW6U-6HSN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022). See generally
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 2.
6. See generally The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report on Investigations
and Proposals for Reform: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 3 (2005)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Ira M. Millstein of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP).
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accountable in the same way that shareholders can in the for-profit
world.7

In other words, although non-profit corporations must comply with
federal tax laws, and their governing bodies must satisfy corporation lawbased duties, they are not subject to the regulatory requirements of
publicly traded corporations. This discrepancy is distressing because the
stakeholders of non-profit organizations are far more vulnerable than the
typical investor, let alone the institutional investors that collectively
manage hundreds of trillions of dollars.8 Additionally, for-profit
shareholders who believe that their organization is nonresponsive can sell
their stock, vote for the removal of directors, and even commence
shareholder derivative actions alleging a breach of fiduciary duties.
However, generally, non-profits lack these vital safeguards.

A. NON-PROFIT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE I.R.C. AND
BOARD MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS
Non-profit organizations deserve special protection because they
exist to serve public welfare purposes but do so at public expense because
they do not pay taxes. Among the most salient differences between forprofit and non-profit corporations is the requirement that non-profits
organize around social welfare-based missions.9 Those missions require
protection and oversight by well-functioning boards, and their
governance should not be undermined by pay-to-play clubs. Furthermore,
it is unclear how much money organizations get in return for selecting
such board members. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Sections 6104(b)
and 170(b)(1)(A) do not require board members to disclose their
contributions; hence, most organizations do not.10 Even a relatively small
sum from the perspective of a large organization may still be a
7.
8.

Id.
Id. See also Record 631 Institutional Investors Managing More than $37 Trillion
in Assets Urge Governments to Step up Ambition to Tackle Global Climate Crisis,
CERES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/record-631institutional-investors-managing-more-37-trillion-assets-urge [https://perma.cc/C2F8QR8K]; Nick Price, Who Governs Nonprofit Organizations?, BD. EFFECT (Feb. 21,
2018), https://www.boardeffect.com/blog/governs-nonprofit-organizations/ [https://
perma.cc/WDR9-H7YW].
9. See generally Erica Harris et al., The Effect of Nonprofit Governance on
Donations: Evidence from the Revised Form 990, 90 ACCT. REV. 579 (2015).
10. I.R.C. §§ 6104(b), 170(b)(1)(A).
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prohibitively high figure to ask of otherwise qualified prospective board
members. To demonstrate this point, imagine that the board of a large
non-profit organization requests that a university professor who
specializes in employment law serve on its board, accompanied by an ask
for a $10,000 donation. Although the professor would make an excellent
addition to the board with her talents, she makes $100,000 per year and
declines to serve because she cannot afford the donation. In that example,
the board lost a significant benefit—improved governance. The board
should have accepted her and not prioritized a donation over its
governance. It could have commemorated any such donation by
conferring naming rights, creating an honorary or advisory board,
awarding an honorary doctorate, or providing another honor that would
not harm the organization’s ability to govern its affairs.
There is a strong and developing line of research that uses publicly
available data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990, which
non-profits are required to file, to demonstrate strong positive
relationships between good governance and organization performance.
For example, researchers created a matrix from IRS Form 990 disclosures
that ranked organizations based on their governance practices and found
that donations and grant levels correlate positively with their governance
measures.11 Other studies have similarly found that increased
transparency correlates positively with organizational performance.12 If
good governance practices trend positively with organization
performance, it is reasonable to assume that those practices would
associate negatively with fraud and diversion of organization assets.
Additional research has borne this hypothesis out.13
These studies, however, are stunted by the limited transparency of
non-profits that decline to disclose the identities of their contributors or
the amounts of their contributions. Accordingly, neither rating entities
nor non-profit stakeholders can assess whether those non-profits
prioritize the selection of directors based on their ability to give.
Consequently, researchers cannot know whether such practices interfere
with the non-profit’s ability to select board members with the skills
11.
12.

Harris et al., supra note 9, at 591-95.
Erica E. Harris & Daniel Neely, Determinants and Consequences of Nonprofit
Transparency, 36 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 195, 196 (2021).
13. Erica Harris et al., Why Bad Things Happen to Good Organizations: The Link
Between Governance and Asset Diversions in Public Charities, 146 J. BUS. ETHICS 149,
164 (2017).
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necessary to govern the organization. Moreover, they do not know
whether the level of giving rises to such a level that it could be reasonable
to claim that the contribution was worth the loss in good governance.

B. NON-PROFIT GOVERNANCE AND BOARD DUTIES
Non-profit organizations perform necessary social services that the
state either does not provide at all or cannot perform to the level that
meets the needs of society. Recently, the burden of providing social
services to members of our society who are most in need shifted toward
non-profit organizations.14 Given their role, diligent oversight by
regulatory authorities and skilled internal governance are essential to
making sure that organizations fulfill their essential missions. A study
analyzing the effect of non-profit governance on donations defined nonprofit governance as “the set of internal and external mechanisms
designed to ensure that managers are working to fulfill their
organization’s charitable mission and fiduciary responsibilities and, in
turn, to minimize the misuse of charitable assets.”15 Likewise, during his
testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Millstein explained
that the role of the board in our non-profit system is to provide such
protection, explaining that its purposes include:
[C]ontinuously reviewing, adapting and strengthening its oversight
responsibilities to meet the changing needs of the organization.
Increasing transparency, adopting conflict of interest policies and
whistleblower procedures, and recruiting individuals with financial or
other skills necessary for the organization are all important, but
underlying such reforms is a fundamental need to make boards
understand their role.16

As a result, directors need to focus on oversight, mission,
transparency, adoption of policies, and identification and selection of the
officers who will run the organization. These are critical roles that should
be held by well-suited individuals, not simply those who can contribute
money.

14. Ann Goggins Gregory & Don Howard, The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle, STAN.
SOC. INNOVATION REV. 49, 50 (2009).
15. Harris et al., supra note 9, at 580.
16. Hearing, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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C. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Although a complete review of the laws that govern the operations
of organizations is beyond the scope of this Article, this section provides
an overview of the basic legal framework. The purpose here is to show
the importance of board selection procedures and how they are designed
to produce boards with the appropriate and necessary skills to govern the
organization, and to demonstrate how current practices and policies fail
to meet the reasonable expectations of non-profit stakeholders.17
The main legal distinction between non-profit and for-profit
corporations is that the focus of the former is social welfare or charitable
missions, whereas the focus of the latter is accumulation of profit.18
Because of their beneficent nature, non-profits are afforded different rules
that may be interpreted as more lenient than the rules for for-profit
organizations.19 Accordingly, laws exist to ensure that each type of
corporation properly pursues those purposes.20 These statutory controls
come from the I.R.C., which gives non-profit organizations life and taxexempt status.21 Most non-profits organize pursuant to the I.R.C.

17. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate
Governance: A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 347, 352, 355-56, 399-402 (2012). See also Michael L. Fassler & Jennifer
Pendergast, Selecting Board Members: Guidelines for an Effective Nominating Process,
FAM. BUS. CONSULTING GRP. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.thefbcg.com/resource/
selecting-board-members-guidelines-for-an-effective-nominating-process/#:~:text=
Importance%20of%20process&text=Selecting%20them%20is%20not%20a,is%20your
%20roadmap%20and%20guide [https://perma.cc/8PU5-J437].
18. Non Profit vs For Profit: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/non-profit-vs-for-profit
[https://perma.cc/2YRU-3PG4]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
19. Emily Heaslip, Nonprofit vs. Not-for-Profit vs. For-Profit: What’s the
Difference?, U.S. CHAMBER, https://www.uschamber.com/co/start/strategy/nonprofitvs-not-for-profit-vs-for-profit#:~:text=%E2%80%9CA%20for%2Dprofit%
20can%20raise
,from%20individuals%2C%20foundations%20and%20corporations
[https://perma.cc/TM8T-KB3F] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022). See also Shoshanna
Delventhal, The Pros and Cons of Being a Nonprofit, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/articles/investing/110215/pros-and-cons-being-nonprofit.asp
[https://perma.cc/VQN5-MTW8] (last updated July 13, 2020).
20. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3)-(4), 527.
21. Id.
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501(c)(3),22 but others, particularly those whose main purpose is to
engage in political activities, organize under § 527.23 Other social welfare
groups organize under § 501(c)(4), which permits them to engage in some
political activities so long as it is not their main purpose.24 That said, most
non-profit organizations do not have to disclose the identities of their
donors.25 The disclosure requirements stem from I.R.C. § 6104(b), which
provides for the inspection of “the information required to be furnished”
in the tax returns of non-profits, but then claws back the requirement to
disclose “the name or address of any contributor . . . (other than . . . a
political organization exempt from taxation under section 527)” or a
private foundation.26 Accordingly, non-profits organized under §
501(c)(3) do not have to disclose their donors. That includes donors who
are also board members. In the absence of knowledge about donations, it
is difficult to determine whether decisions to prioritize contributions
harm board performance. If non-profits engage in for-profit activities27 or
fail to file their tax returns (IRS Form 990),28 the IRS, state, or local
authorities may strip them of their tax-exempt status and treat them as

22. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Non-profits are also statutorily required to be “operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes.” Id.
23. I.R.C. § 527.
24. Otherwise, the IRS may reclassify § 501(c)(4) organizations that do not operate
as social welfare organizations as I.R.C. § 527 organizations, which must disclose the
identities of their donors to the IRS. Rick Cohen, IRS Strips Electoral Group of 501(c)(4)
Status; Will Widespread Crackdown Follow?, NONPROFIT Q. (June 11, 2012),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/irs-strips-electoral-group-of-501c4-status-willwidespread-crackdown-follow/ [https://perma.cc/MSG6-3HRF].
25. I.R.C. § 6104(b).
26. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) sets forth the exception. I.R.C. § 6104(b).
27. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986). But see Marni Jameson
Carey, How Nonprofit Hospitals Get Away with the Biggest Rip Off in America, MED.
ECONS. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/med-ec-blog/hownonprofit-hospitals-get-away-biggest-rip-america/ [https://perma.cc/V9YJ-AAFT].
28. See, e.g., Charlie Kratovil, IRS Strips Tax-Exempt Status from Brunswick-Based
Police Agency, NEW BRUNSWICK TODAY (Feb. 19, 2017), https://newbrunswicktoday.
com/2017/02/19/irs-strips-tax-exempt-status-from-brunswick-based-police-agency/
[https://perma.cc/8Y5Y-JXEX]. See also Emily Schultheis, IRS Strips Richard
Spencer’s Nonprofit of its Tax-Exempt Status, CBS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2017, 11:38 AM),
https://www. cbsnews.com/news/irs-strips-richard-spencer-nonprofit-of-its-tax-exemptstatus/ [https://perma.cc/4KTE-7NXW].
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for-profit entities.29 State attorneys general may also sue non-profit
organizations that are believed to be violating the law to recover assets
wasted by the organization or obtain orders withdrawing their charters.30
It is therefore essential that boards have procedures in place to ensure that
their organizations are complying with applicable laws in order to remain
focused on their missions and maintain their preferable status.31
In contrast to the disclosure-based framework of the IRS, which
requires non-profits to make certain disclosures, for-profit organizations
are governed by explicit laws and stock exchange rules that require
certain conduct.32 For example, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules
require listed companies to perform a host of activities, such as selfevaluations to determine the extent to which their boards and committees
(including any nominating committees) are performing their
responsibilities. Those rules and common practices include requirements
that a public company:


Performs an annual self-evaluation to determine whether its
nomination committee (or the group performing similar functions) is
“functioning effectively”;33

29. Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax
(2021), IRS (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990#en_US_2021_
publink11283jd0e1650 [https://perma.cc/QFH4-A868]. See generally, Int’l Sch. Servs.,
Inc. v. W. Windsor Twp., 991 A.2d 848 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (denying tax
exempt status of organization for using its property for profit). See also Andrew
Kitchenman, Deal Strips Morristown Medical Center of Some of Its Tax-Exempt Status,
NJ SPOTLIGHT NEWS (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.njspotlight.com/2015/11/15-11-11agreement-strips-morristown-medical-center-of-some-of-its-tax-exempt-status/
[https://perma.cc/ZS69-9TR7].
30. See, e.g., AG Racine Sues Failed Nonprofit Related to U.S. Pavilion at World’s
Fair for Improperly Paying Founds More Than $360K in Charitable Funds, OFF. ATT’Y
GEN. FOR D.C. (June 8, 2021), https://oag.dc.gov/release/ag-racine-sues-failednonprofit-related-us [https://perma.cc/7LCF-9BAC].
31. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998).
32. Erica Harris et al., supra note 9, at 581.
33. Corporate Governance Guidelines, § 303A.09 N.Y.S.E. Listed Co. Manual
(CCH) (amended Nov. 25, 2009), https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-companymanual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588B
F4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-77
[https://perma.cc/2VSQ-6QN3].
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“[Makes] its corporate governance guidelines available on or through
its website”;34



“[Has] a nominating/corporate governance committee composed
entirely of independent directors”;35



Adopts a written charter for its nominating committee; 36



“[Identifies] individuals qualified to become board members,
consistent with criteria approved by the board”;37



Has a charter that addresses “an annual performance evaluation of the
committee”;38



“[Makes] its nominating/corporate governance committee charter
available on or through its website”;39



Discloses “[a] description of . . . any specific, minimum qualifications
that the nominating committee believes must be met by a nominee in

34.
35.

Id.
Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, 303A.04(a) N.Y.S.E. Listed Co.
Manual (CCH) (amended Nov. 25, 2009), https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listedcompany-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%
23teid-72 [https://perma.cc/W48K-7ZUL].
36. Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, 303A.04(b) N.Y.S.E. Listed
Co. Manual (CCH) (amended Nov. 25, 2009), https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listedcompany-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23
teid-72 [https://perma.cc/PBH6-AE5N].
37. Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, 303A.04(b)(i) N.Y.S.E. Listed
Co. Manual (CCH) (amended Nov. 25, 2009), https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listedcompany-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B
0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-72
[https://perma.cc/T6NF-E9P4].
38. Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, 303A.04(b)(ii) N.Y.S.E. Listed
Co. Manual (CCH) (amended Nov. 25, 2009), https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listedcompany-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B
0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-72
[https://perma.cc/A8MH-FLT2].
39. Id.
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order to be considered for nomination by the committee to the
company’s board of directors;40


Discloses “any specific qualities or skills that the nominating
committee believes are necessary for one or more of the company’s
directors to possess”;41



Discloses “processes for identifying and evaluating director
nominees”;42 and



Discloses whether they pay a third party or parties “to identify or
evaluate or assist in identifying or evaluating potential nominees, the
function performed by each such third party.”43

Non-profits do not face these explicit requirements for good
governance. This is an unfortunate revelation given that their
stakeholders are among the most vulnerable and underserved. Non-profit
stakeholders lack the protections of securities laws.44 Further, their boards
are volunteers, and they are not subject to extensive regulatory
oversight.45 As such, it is all the more essential for them to select board
members based on their ability to govern, and not prioritize their capacity
to donate money as a prerequisite to service in a way that will interfere
with that preeminent responsibility.
In general, state corporation laws provide that “the business and
affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors . . . . [As they are corporations, non-profit
organizations] are governed by boards of directors (or trustees).”46 Like
their for-profit counterparts, directors of non-profit organizations own

40. SEC Adopts Final Rules Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, FINDLAW,
https://corporate.findlaw.com/corporate-governance/sec-adopts-final-rules-regardingnominating-committee-functions.html [https://perma.cc/Q8ME-RYHH] (last updated
Mar. 26, 2008).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Can Board Members Be Paid?, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/can-board-members-be-paid
[https://perma.cc/5T6F-ZEWJ] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022). See also Price, supra note 8.
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2020).
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duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.47 The duty of care requires
directors adhere to reasonable standard of care and make informed
decisions.48 Duty of loyalty issues arise where a director puts his interests
above that of the organization or its stakeholders.49 This duty requires
that, in making a decision for the organization, directors act for its benefit,
and not to benefit themselves or an outside interest at the organization’s
expense.50 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he duty
of loyalty . . . requires that corporate officers devote themselves to the
corporate affairs with a view to promote the common interests and not
their own.”51 As a result, under both the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty, board members must act in good faith.52 Similarly, directors and
their boards must maintain the “good faith belief [that they are] acting in
the corporation’s best interest.”53 Although the business judgment rule
presumes that directors act in good faith, the presumption may be rebutted
where the directors have “knowledge concerning the matter in question
that would cause [their] reliance to be unwarranted”54 or where there is
evidence of self-dealing.55
Non-profit boards also have an additional obligation that derives
from the condition that non-profits further a social welfare mission: the
duty of obedience.56 “The duty of obedience . . . describe[s] the board’s
obligation to remain faithful to the organization’s purpose and mission.”57
As a result of these duties, non-profit organizations need protection by
boards that focus on governance.

47. See, e.g., In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626-28 (3d Cir.
2015).
48. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 356.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 381.
51. In re Lemington Home, 777 F.3d at 626 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
52. Id.
53. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 375.
54. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5712(b) (2021).
55. Adam Hayes, Business Judgment Rule, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/b/businessjudgmentrule.asp#:~:text=A%20legal%20staple%20
in%20common,care%20directors%20owe%20to%20stakeholders
[https://perma.cc/DPQ3-ZMWA] (last updated Apr. 27, 2022).
56. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 386-87.
57. Id. at 356.
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II. REVIEW OF THE STUDY
A. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY
The motivation for this Study was prompted by a concern that nonprofit boards are prioritizing the ability to contribute funds over the ability
to contribute to good governance. The purpose of this Study is to
empirically test whether non-profit management believes that their
boards prioritize the ability to contribute money in board selection and
retention procedures. It also measured whether non-profit leadership felt
that any such procedures compromised organizational outcomes.
B. METHODOLOGY
This Study seeks to answer two primary research questions related
to non-profit board membership and governance: 1) Do non-profit
executive officers report that their organization prioritizes board
membership based on an individual’s ability to give?; and 2) Do they
report that prioritizing a board member’s ability to give financially affects
the organization’s capacity to attract and retain board members with
diverse skillsets, which ensures organizational success?
C. DATA
We surveyed 620 executive officers of non-profit organizations
about their board selection practices. We purchased access to an opt-in
survey panel of professionals through the market research firm Opinions
4 Good (Op4G).58 Our team, including a lawyer specializing in business
ethics and survey research experts from Temple University’s Institute for
Survey Research, an academic survey research center, drafted the
questionnaire by drawing on literature concerning non-profit
management. After several months of reviewing, refining, and pilot
testing the instrument, the questionnaire was programmed into Qualtrics,
(Qualtrics) a powerful online survey tool,59 and survey links were sent to

58. About, OPINIONS4GOOD, https://opinions4good.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/
Q2RK-NX72] (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
59. Build Technology that Closes Experience Gaps, QUALTRICS, https://www.
qualtrics.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/Z2EY-9SXB] (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
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Op4G for distribution to their large, professional network of non-profit
executives.
The first question on the survey screened for non-profit senior
leaders, such as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief Financial
Officers (CFOs), Chief Operating Officers (COOs), Executive Directors,
and Directors of Development. These senior leaders were subsequently
asked a series of questions about board selection practices, including their
opinions on whether those practices were effective in attracting and
retaining a board with diverse skillsets, and opinions about whether they
personally believed that prioritizing board member giving resulted in
good board governance and organizational success. The non-profit
leaders were also asked about the size of their organization and whether
there were explicit expectations of board giving and amounts expected.
Op4G deployed the survey to a very large panel of professionals
recruited through various trade associations and professional
memberships. The sample selection criteria included high-level
executives of non-profit organizations with an annual budget larger than
$100,000. We used quota sampling to ensure responses from non-profit
organizations with annual budgets within five ranges: $100,000 to
$499,999; $500,000 to $999,999; $1,000,000 to $4,999,999; $5,000,000
to $9,999,999; and $10,000,000 or more.60 The goal was to have 40
respondents in each group for an initial total sample size of n=200. Table
1 indicates the distribution of respondents by annual organizational
budget size61 and Table 2 shows the distribution of size of the
organization by number of employees.62

60. Quota sampling is a type of non-probability sampling method. This means that
elements from the population are chosen on a non-random basis, and all members of the
population do not have an equal chance of being selected to be a part of the sample group.
However, it does ensure representativeness across an a priori set of strata, here
organizational sizes. The goal is to eliminate post-stratification weighting of the data.
61. See infra Table 1.
62. See infra Table 2.
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Table 1. Respondents by Annual Budget Size of the Organization
Annual Budget of Organization
n
Percent
$100,000 - $499,999
124
20
$500,000 - $999,999
127
21
$1,000,000 - 4,999,999
120
19
$5,000,000 - 9,999,999
126
20
$10,000,000+
123
20
There is an equal distribution across budget sizes because we used
quota sampling to ensure representation of this organizational trait. The
number of employees working at each organization is set forth in Table
2.
Table 2. Respondents by Number of Employees Working
at the Organization
Number of Employees
n
Percent
0-10
117
19
11-50
51-100
101-500
500+
Total

189
139
125
50
620

31
22
20
8
100

The distribution of respondents by total number of organizational
employees indicates that percentage of respondents is slightly higher (31
percent) in the 11-50 category and much smaller (8 percent) in the largest
category of 500 employees and above, which is representative of the
overall numbers of these types of organizations. Op4G provided unique
identifiers for each respondent, as well as IDs for any non-eligible
respondents (“non-eligibles”) due to the quota sampling.63 The data were

63. A respondent becomes non-eligible to be included in the study sample if he or
she meets the qualifications to be included, but the desired total number of respondents
in a particular strata (here, organizational budget size) has already been reached.
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uploaded to Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) for
analysis.64
D. ANALYSIS
We conducted statistical analyses of all three data extracts separately
to satisfy any concerns that there were statistical differences among the
samples. Responses and patterns were consistent across all three samples,
so we analyzed a final data extract of the full dataset. Analyses included
univariate descriptive statistics,65 as well as bivariate crosstabs,66 and Chisquare tests67 to determine statistical significance of any observed
associations. We used a significance threshold (the “p-value”) of .05, and,
to manage any issues of multiple testing, we tested only those hypotheses
that would provide evidence for or against the three main research
questions.
E. RESULTS
To answer the first research question, “[d]o non-profit executive
officers report that their organization prioritizes board membership based
on an individual’s ability to give?,” we analyzed a series of Likert-type
questions where executives were asked “to what extent to you agree or
disagree” with a series of statements about their organization.68 The

64. SPSS – Statistical Package for Social Sciences, STAT. SOLS., https://www.
statisticssolutions.com/spss-statisticalpackageforsocialsciences/
[https://perma.cc/9R5L-JAYG] (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
65. Univariate descriptive statistics imply the calculation of the preferred estimate
(mean, proportion) on each question (variable) individually.
66. Bivariate descriptive statistics include analyses of two variables at once. For
example, a cross-tabulation of a perception of board’s ability to attract and retain diverse
skillsets alongside organizational size. This allows the researcher the ability to detect
differences in non-profit leaders’ opinions or perceptions across organizational sizes.
67. Chi-square tests are used to determine whether or not the differences or trends
detected in the cross-tabulation are statistically significant given the sample size, and
type-I error rate. The formula is C2=∑(Oi-Ei)2/Ei, where Oi = Observed Value and Ei =
Expected Value. The statistic is a measure of the difference between the observed and
expected frequencies of the outcomes. It is useful for analyzing differences among
categorical/nominal variables.
68. A Likert scale is a type of psychometric response scale in which respondents
specify their level of agreement to a statement, typically in five points: 1) Strongly
disagree; 2) Disagree; 3) Neither agree or disagree; 4) Agree; 5) Strongly agree.
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response category included a five-point scale from “strongly agree” to
“strongly disagree.” Table 3 below shows that 69 percent of executives
“agreed” or “strongly agreed” that “a prospective board member’s ability
to give financially to the organization influences the likelihood that a
person will be selected as a board member.”
Table 3. Management’s Perceptions of Likelihood that Board
Member’s Ability to Give Affects Likelihood She is Selected to the
Board
Percent of Management’s Agreement with the Following Statement:
A Prospective Board Member’s Ability to Give Financially Influences
the Likelihood that a Person will be Selected to the Board
n
Percent
Strongly Agree
92
15
Agree
337
54
Neither Disagree or Agree
133
22
Disagree
43
7
Strongly Disagree
15
2
Total
620
100
Additionally, an overwhelming majority–81 percent–responded
“very” or “somewhat” to the question “[t]o what extent does your
organization prioritize the selection of board members based on their
ability to contribute money to the organization?,” with 38 percent
reporting “very” and 43 percent reporting “somewhat.” Clearly, a large
majority of respondents in this sample believe that non-profit boards
prioritize financial giving, and that giving influences the likelihood of
someone being selected to join the board. Moreover, this pattern is
consistent across organizational budget sizes.69 For organizations whose
budgets are $100,000 to $500,000, 14 percent reported that the ability to
give was prioritized “very little” in board selection, whereas 86 percent
say they prioritize giving ability “somewhat” or “very much.” That
pattern is similar across budget sizes. The Chi-Square test suggests that
organization size and budget have no influence on the distribution of how
much an organization prioritizes board members’ ability to give. The
majority of organizations do prioritize it—and it does not matter what
size organization they are in. And this finding is statistically significant.
69.

See infra Table 4.
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Table 4. Management Perception of Prioritizing Board Giving by
Organizational Budget Size
$100,000

$500,000

$1,000,000

$5,000,000

$10,000,000

-

-

-

-

+

$499,999

$999,999

$4,999,999

$9,999,999

n

17

27

26

26

24

Percent

13.7

21.3

21.7

20.6

19.5

n

107

100

94

100

99

Percent

86.3

78.7

78.3

79.4

80.5

Total

Prioritize
Giving:
Not at all,

120

A Little
Somewhat,

500

Very Much

*(Chi Sq = 3.37, d.f.=4, p=0.49)
We also asked executive officers “[h]ow much money are board
members expected to give to the organization each year?” Table 5
presents the number and percent of organizations with expected giving
amounts.
Table 5. Expected Giving Amount
How Much Money are Board
Members Expected to Give
$0-$100
$101-$250
$251-$500
$501-$1,000
$1,001-$5,000
Over $5,000
Missing
Total

n

percent

9
30
99
204
149
62
67
620

2
5
16
33
24
10
11

The chart reflects that 67 percent of the 553 executives who
responded to this question reported that directors are expected to give
over $501 each year with 24 percent reporting that directors are expected
to give between $1,001 and $5,000, and 11 percent expected directors to
give in excess of $5,000.
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We then examined whether the amount of expected giving is
associated with the extent to which organizations prioritize giving in
board selection decisions.
Table 6. Extent to Which Organizations Prioritize Giving by
Expected Giving Amounts
$0-

$101-

$251-

$501-

$1,001 -

$5,001+

Total

$100

$250

$500

$1,000

$5,000

n

4

4

12

34

22

5

81

Percent

4.9

4.9

14.8

42.0

27.2

6.2

100

n

5

26

87

170

127

57

472

Percent

1.1

5.5

18.4

36

26.9

12.1

100

Prioritize
Giving
Not at all,
A Little
Somewhat,
Very Much

*(Chi Sq = 9.75, d.f.=5, p=0.08)
We found that there is no statistically significant association between
the amount board members are expected to give to organizations and the
extent to which boards prioritize giving. However, there are slight
differences in the tails of the distribution. For example, of those boards
that prioritize giving “somewhat” or “very much,” 12 percent expect their
board members to give over $5,000, whereas only 6 percent of boards
that do not prioritize, or prioritize a little, are expected to give over
$5,000.
We then proceeded to answer the second research question, “[d]o
executives report that prioritizing a board member’s ability to give affects
the organization’s ability to attract and retain board members with diverse
skillsets that help ensure organizational success?” To operationalize
“diverse skillsets” we asked executive officers the extent to which they
agree or disagree with a series of statements. Table 7 shows a subset that
relates to the prioritization of attracting board members who have
extensive experience relevant to the organization, sufficient time to
satisfy their board responsibilities, and who will be engaged, attentive,
and willing to spend the necessary energy.
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Table 7. Percent of Executive Officers Who Believe Prioritizing the
Ability to Give Affects the Organization’s Ability to Attract Board
Members with Diverse Skillsets that Help Ensure Organizational Success
When our

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

organization

Strongly

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly

Total

prioritizes the

Agree

Agree or

selection of board

Disagree

Disagree

members based on
their ability to
contribute money, it
affects the
organization’s
ability to attract
people who:
Have extensive

11.2

54.3

31.4

2.9

0.2

100

26.5

47.7

18

1.9

5.8

100

23.6

54

18

1.5

2.9

100

29.4

49.9

19.2

1

0.5

100

29

52.1

17.3

1

0.7

100

experience relevant
to the organization
Have sufficient time
to satisfy their
responsibilities as
board members
Will be engaged
board members
Will be attentive
board members
Will be willing to
expend the energy
necessary to satisfy
their responsibilities
as board members

Table 7 indicates that the vast majority of executive officers “agree”
or “strongly agree” that prioritizing board members’ ability to give
negatively affects the organization’s ability to attract people who have
the skillsets needed for organizational success. Furthermore, there is no
statistically significant relationship between the extent to which a board
prioritizes giving and the pattern of agreement across the effect on board
members’ experience, willing time commitment, engagement,
attentiveness, and energy. That is to say, across the board, leadership

464

[Vol. XXVII

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

agrees that prioritizing giving negatively affects these attributes of board
members.
We then analyzed the same series of questions as it related to
retaining board members with diverse skillsets. Table 8 shows a different
set of responses concerning the retention of board members.
Table 8. Percent of Executive Officers who Believe Prioritizing the Ability
to Give Affects the Organization’s Ability to Retain Board Members with
Diverse Skillsets that Help Ensure Organizational Success
When our organization

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

prioritizes the selection of

Strongly

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly

Total

board members based on

Agree

Agree or

their ability to contribute

Disagree

Disagree

money, it affects the
organization’s ability to
attract people who:
Have extensive experience

19

58.2

20

1.9

1

100

25.5

49.4

21.1

1.5

2.4

100

28.7

49.1

19.5

1.5

1.2

100

29.9

45.5

20.9

1.9

1.7

100

29.4

49.6

19

0.7

1.2

100

relevant to the organization
Have sufficient time to
satisfy their responsibilities
as board members
Will be engaged board
members
Will be attentive board
members
Will be willing to expend
the energy necessary to
satisfy their responsibilities
as board members

Table 8 confirms that an overwhelming majority of executive
officers of non-profit organizations “agree” or “strongly agree” that
prioritizing giving affects their ability to retain people who have the
diverse skillsets needed for organizational success.70 The majority of
70. As compared to Table 7, there is a difference in management perceptions of
prioritizing giving on the ability to attract versus the ability to retain board members. A
larger proportion of those organizations who do not prioritize giving disagree that
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executive officers who report their organizations prioritize giving
somewhat or a lot “agree” or “strongly agree” that the board selection
criteria negatively affects the organization’s ability to attract and retain
board members with diverse skillsets.
We then asked whether the executive officers believe that their
organizations’ boards would be more effective if they adopted some of
the procedures followed by for-profit boards. We asked them “[h]ow
effective do you believe the following practices would be to create
effective boards?”71
Table 9. Percent of Executive Officers who Believe that the Following
Practices would Help Create Effective Boards
In general, how

percent

percent

percent

percent

percent

percent

effective do you

Very

Valuable

Somewhat

Limited

Not

Total

believe the

Valuable

Valuable

Value

Valuable

following
practices would
be to creating
effective boards?
Performing an

32.8

44.5

14.1

7.1

0.2

100

In general, how

percent

percent

percent

percent

percent

percent

effective do you

Very

Valuable

Somewhat

Limited

Not

Total

believe the

Valuable

Valuable

Value

Valuable

annual selfevaluation of
board
performance

following
practices would
be to creating
effective boards?

prioritizing giving affects their ability to retain (not attract) board members who have
extensive experience relative to the organization (Chi-Sq =25.7, d.f.=4, p=.00) and retain
board members who have the energy necessary to satisfy their duties (Chi-Sq=83.6,
d.f.=3, p=.00). This is likely because they report that they do not prioritize giving.
71. See Table 9.
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26.5

30.9

25.8

14.4

1.7

100

20.4

32.1

35.5

10.2

1.2

100

29.2

36.3

24.1

7.5

2.4

100

24.1

33.1

30.7

9.5

2.4

100

21.4

33.3

30.2

9

5.4

100

20.7

35

28.7

9.2

5.1

100

20

33.8

29.8

10.2

6.8

100

22.6

31.9

27.5

12.2

5.1

100

annual selfevaluation of the
performance of
the nominating
committee
Adopting a
written charter for
the nominating
committee
Drafting a list of
qualifications that
must be met by
the nominee
Maintain a
standing
nominating
committee
Paying a third
party to assist in
identifying
nominees
Paying a third
party to assist in
evaluating
nominees
Maintain records
of gender identity
of nominees
Maintain records
of racial identity
of nominees

Table 9 reflects that most non-profit executive officers would find
many of the practices used by for-profit boards to be “valuable” or “very
valuable.”
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III. DISCUSSION
This Study shows that senior management at non-profit
organizations believe that their organizations prioritize the ability to give
financially in their board selection and retention decisions and that they
do so across all organizational sizes.72 They also report that this practice
comes at a cost to the organization in terms of finding and retaining the
needed organizational skillsets and its effects on organizational
performance.73 Senior management believes that the continued practice
of prioritizing the potential for donations in board selection and retention
decisions distracts from recruiting candidates who have passion for the
mission, extensive experience relevant to the organization, and sufficient
time to be fully engaged and attentive in their responsibilities as board
members.74 These findings are a warning sign that board selection and
retention criteria may not provide sufficient protection to the
organizations that the boards serve.
We further maintain that prioritization based on the ability to give
money has a tenuous relationship to board members’ ability to fulfill
mission-related and fiduciary duties. As such, board selection and
retention criteria that are focused on giving over other criteria—such as
being social-mission focused and fully engaged and attentive in their
responsibilities—could contribute to poor governance. Good governance
requires a board with diverse and deep expertise that will more
competently provide useful strategic oversight to management. As other
researchers have pointed out, it is important that boards reflect the
constituencies that they serve.75 We argue that failing to have a board with
the right profile is bad governance or, at the very least, mediocre
governance. Further, the continued give-or-get ethos is perpetuating the
challenges of constituting broadly diverse boards. For example, a board
composed entirely of wealthy individuals may foster great financial
support for the non-profit’s mission, but can suffer from poor attendance
and poor program participation, resulting in weak governance. Weak
governance comes at a cost to non-profit stakeholders, and this Study’s
practical consequences warn there is a managerial belief that current

72.
73.
74.
75.

(1967).

See supra Table 3, Table 4.
See supra Table 7, Table 8.
Id.
See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT

OF

REPRESENTATION
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selection procedures interfere with the choosing of the very people one
would expect to be fully engaged and attentive in their responsibilities as
board members.
A. RISKS OF LOSS AT NON-PROFITS DUE TO MALFEASANCE
When non-profits lack good governance, they can fall prey to
otherwise avoidable problems and risk damaging their missions. Recent
scandals highlight all too common instances when failures of external and
internal oversight caused public harm and tarnished the collective
reputations of non-profit organizations. In 2015, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a decision finding that the directors of a non-profit
nursing home breached their duty of care when they failed to remove a
CFO who did not keep financial records and an unqualified CEO.76 The
directors (along with the officers) were found to be liable for $2,250,000
in damages.77 The directors were not sufficiently focused on governance
to recognize what would have otherwise been an obvious problem for
them to address.78
Other problems at non-profit organizations highlight the need for
better internal controls at the board level.79 For instance, In the Matter of
the Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman involved an investigation of
and settlement by the Disabled Veterans National Foundation (DVNF)
and the direct marketing companies it retained, Quadriga Art and
Convergence Direct Marketing.80 In that matter, the Office of the New
York State Attorney General found that, in connection with fundraising,
the DVNF engaged in “misleading statements regarding the nature [of its]
programs and [the] effectiveness” of the organization.81 The findings
revealed an organization in which “[n]one of the founding directors had
any [prior] experience dealing with direct mail campaigns or large-scale

In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Barbara E. Taylor et al., The New Work of the Nonprofit Board, HARV. BUS.
REV.
(1996),
https://hbr.org/1996/09/the-new-work-of-the-nonprofit-board
[https://perma.cc/ AN94-5RMY].
80. Assurance of Discontinuance at 2, In re the Investigation by Eric T.
Schneiderman (2014) (No. 14-145), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/DVNF-QuadrigaConvergence-AOD_14-145.PDF [https://perma.cc/TW4T-6JH4].
81. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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fundraising.”82 More significant focus on governance in board selection
decisions would have prevented this problem. Instead, the unqualified
board relied on Quadriga Art and Convergence Direct Marketing to
conduct direct marketing for it.83 The Attorney General concluded that
those arrangements netted $115,000,000, and 90 percent of that sum was
used to pay its “direct mail expenses.”84 Additionally, “despite having
already paid over $104 million to its direct mail vendors, [the DVNF was]
still in debt to [its marketing partners] in the amount of $14 million.”85
The resulting settlement reportedly required the DVNF to “discontinue
misleading fundraising appeals” and led to its retention of an
“experienced fundraiser for a new position of development director.” 86
Similarly, the Attorney General of New York sued the National Rifle
Association of America, Inc. (the NRA), seeking an order dissolving the
non-profit organization.87 The Attorney General asked the court to
withdraw the NRA’s charter alleging, among other things, that the
directors and members wasted corporate assets, and that its audit
committee was a rubber stamp for fraudulent and self-interested dealings
by its officers, costing the organization millions of dollars.88 Proper
attention to governance by the boards of these organizations would likely
have protected the stakeholders of the organizations from the alleged
abuse of its officers and directors.
In another case, the governance failings of the Florida Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (the “FCADV”) contributed to a scandal in
which the state of Florida sued the anti-domestic violence organization.89
The FCADV’s purpose was to allocate funds to domestic violence
centers.90 However, as a result of its board’s lax governance standards, it
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Suzanne Perry, N.Y. Wins $25-Million in Fundraising Abuse Case (June 30,
2014), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/n-y-wins-25-million-in-fundraising-abusecase/ [https://perma.cc/Z9K2-6PJC].
87. Verified Complaint at 5, New York v. Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., Inc. (2020)
(No. 451625/2020).
88. Id. at 11-12.
89. Mary Ellen Klas & Samantha J. Gross, Florida Sues Nonprofit and its Former
CEO Who Was Paid $7.5M, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.tampabay.
com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/03/04/state-sues-nonprofit-and-its-former-ceo-whowas-paid-75m/ [https://perma.cc/3ZKD-Y773].
90. Id.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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approved the CEO’s request for $4 million in paid time off without asking
sufficient questions.91 Eventually, and after the damage had been done,
the board voted to place the FCADV in receivership, which likely would
not have been necessary if it were properly governed in the first place.92
Other cases reflect a lack of public oversight of non-profit
organizations, compounding the argument for the necessity of good
governance. In a 2019 case, the Key WorldWide Foundation reported in
its tax filings that it paid nearly $2 million to tutor children in Oakland,
California and fund dental work for needy Cambodians.93 However, those
funds were not used for those purposes and WorldWide’s IRS filings did
not contain, and were not required to contain, documentation for the
payments.94 That money did not go to the needy. Instead, the non-profit
funneled money to colleges and universities in order to help wealthy
people get their children into elite schools.95 Further abusing the tax laws,
the parents freely deducted their “donations,” relying on the non-profit
status of Key WorldWide.96 In early March 2019, the foundation’s
president pled guilty to federal crimes including racketeering and money
laundering.97
In a separate incident reflecting the serious lack of public oversight
over non-profit organizations, the Federal Trade Commission (the FTC)
and official representatives of every state and the District of Columbia
sued the Cancer Fund of American and affiliated entities for violating
federal and state statutes and common law, alleging it fraudulently
induced and absconded with $187 million in donations.98
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The purpose of outlining these scandals is to demonstrate that,
despite their philanthropic missions, non-profits without strong corporate
governance are at high risk of abuse. Such organizations need to be
protected by board members with necessary abilities and specific
disclosure requirements to reduce the all too present risks to their
missions. This is particularly essential because non-profits serve our most
needy populations, exist at public expense, and are not monitored to the
extent that for-profit organizations are.99 Organizations should find
alternative ways to honor grantors, such as through a gala, naming rights,
or the creation of an honorary boards that do not have governance roles.
Jay Leno, for example, donated to United Hatzalah, a non-profit mobile
medical services organization.100 He serves on the “honorary board” of
the organization, but is not on the audit committee.101 That honorary
board appears to be an “advisory board” that does not have governance
obligations.102 As one leading commentator explained:
Non-profit organizations can be established with either an advisory
board or with a governing board. Unlike formal governing boards,
advisory boards do not have either statutory authority or statutory
obligations. In contrast, when a board is established as a formal
governing board, board members have fiduciary obligations.103

There is a benefit to honoring those who donate to worthy cases, and
this is not to say that there are no good reasons to place wealthy donors
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(2015).
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jpost.com/diaspora/jay-leno-helps-raise-5-for-united-hatzalah-at-gala-582581
[https://perma.cc/WKB4-5KXM].
101. International Committee, UNITED HATZALAH, https://israelrescue.org/blog/
international-committee/ [https://perma.cc/DNC3-EC9] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
102. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 355.
103. Id.

472

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

on a non-profit board. They may have expertise or the ability to attract
attention that will help the organization fulfill its mission. However, it
does more harm than good to prioritize giving ability over operational
effectiveness in non-profit board selection; such a decision has the
potential to undermine the capacity of the governing board to protect the
integrity of the organization. This prioritization is especially concerning
because current IRS rules do not require disclosure of board member
contributions, making it difficult to accurately measure its impact.
B. UNDISCLOSED CONTRIBUTIONS OF DIRECTORS
In order to evaluate whether an organization has good governance,
people frequently turn to Charity Navigator, an organization that rates the
accountability and transparency of charities with a focus on good
governance practices.104 To do so, it collects data from non-profits’ IRS
Form 990s and reviews charities’ the websites.105 As to governance,
Charity Navigator considers whether organizations have:


Independent boards of at least five members and whether the
independent members have a voting majority;



Absence of diversion of assets;



Audited financials prepared by an independent accountant with
oversight from a dedicated board committee;



Absence of loans to or from related parties;



Board meeting minutes;



Provided the organization’s IRS Form 990 to the board before it is
filed;

104. See About Us, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.
cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=8658 [https://perma.cc/ET5G-QUH5] (last visited Apr.
10, 2022). See also How Do We Rate Charities’ Accountability and Transparency?,
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&
cpid=1093/ [https://perma.cc/3N7R-WE4U] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
105. Accountability and Transparency Ratings Tables, CHARITY NAVIGATOR,
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1283
[https://perma.cc/7A93-6AQX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
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Conflict of interest and whistleblower policies;



Document retention and destruction policies;



Disclosed the CEO’s salary;



Documented criteria for calculation of the CEO’s salary; and



Confirmed that board members are not compensated.106

In assessing organization accountability and transparency, Charity
Navigator also confirms that the organization provides the following
information on its website:


Identities of board members;



Listing of key staff;



Published audited financial statements;



Published its IRS Form 990; and



Assurance of privacy of donor lists.107

Charity Navigator then calculates a score by adding measures of
financial health to the organization’s accountability and transparency
scores by allotting them an original score of 100 on each and making
deductions for relative failures to comply with the required criteria.108 It
also publishes lists of the top charities overall and in various sectors.109
Although its governance and transparency criteria are a reasonable
manner to evaluate non-profit overall governance and performance,
Charity Navigator does not directly evaluate the ability of each board
member to contribute to good governance, and it does not consider the

106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
How Do We Calculate the Overall Score and Star Rating?, CHARITY
NAVIGATOR,
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1287/
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role of selection procedures that prioritize ability to contribute money.110
It cannot do so, because the rankings are based on what the IRS requires
non-profits to disclose, which does not include a certification that good
governance is a high priority in the selection of board members.
C. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
One way to partially remedy this information gap would be to add
questions to IRS Form 990111 that would confirm the importance of
governance in board selection. For example, non-profit organizations
would be well served if the IRS were to add questions akin to the
following:


Is quality governance the first priority of the organization in selecting
persons to serve on its governing body?; or



Does the governing board have a policy prioritizing the quality of
governance in its selection of its members?

These types of certifications would make it more difficult for boards
to be taken over by wealthy donors who may be more interested in
demonstrating or exercising power than those with the skills necessary to
help the organization fulfill its mission. Additionally, federal law should
be expanded to require that non-profit organizations disclose the names
and contribution amounts of all their board members.
Moreover, the absence of donor information means that stakeholders
do not know whether people are buying their way onto boards. This also
precludes them from assessing the benefits or costs of organization’s
prioritization of giving ability as a criterion to select board members. That
is, one could conceive of situations in which it would be an advantage to
allow a particular person who does not have the ability to contribute to
good governance onto a non-profit board. Perhaps admitting a celebrity
whose prominence would further the mission of the organization could
benefit the mission more than the loss of a board member who could
contribute to better governance would hurt it. Similarly, allowing
110. Accountability and Transparency Ratings Tables, CHARITY NAVIGATOR,
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1283
[https://perma.cc/VK4X-2SL4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
111. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 367-68 (providing a clear summary of
IRS requirements).
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someone who gave such a significant amount of money that it would
further the mission of the organization more than the organization would
lose in good governance might be a reasonable choice. But because
information on how much board members give is publicly unavailable,
the burden should be on the organization to show that selection
procedures that prioritize picking board members based on their ability
to give is a good thing.
Additionally, taxpayers have a right to know how boards make their
decisions. Because the public allows them to have tax exempt status,
these organizations should be obligated to show that their activities
further their missions. IRS Form 1023 sets forth the mission of non-profit
organizations, and non-profits owe their existence to its protections.112
Yet, direct stakeholders and taxpayers have no realistic way of assessing
the ability of and extent to which organizations are meeting their missions
if they will not disclose how they select their board members. In the
absence of disclosure of director donations, boards cannot show that that
the loss to governance led to a net gain in the furtherance of the
organization’s missions.
A board that knowingly trades money for governance may not be
acting in good faith, in the interests of its organization, or in furtherance
of the mission. Trading governance for money breaches organizations’
duties to their stakeholders because, as discussed, doing so affects their
ability to attract people who will be engaged and effective board members
and have the time to dedicate to that cause. If the selection of board
members relies on the ability to contribute undermines those basic
abilities, selection practices may be interfering with obtaining effective
board members and should be changed or, at minimum, receive closer
scrutiny than they currently receive. One may maintain that an
organization can have it both ways, that someone may be qualified and
make contributions. That may be true; however, not only must the
qualification piece come first, but there also must be a way for
stakeholders to make that assessment for themselves.

112. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1023 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f1023.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P7J-NWXF]. See also Instructions for Form 1023
(01/2020), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1023 [https://perma.cc/BE3K-SLJW]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
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CONCLUSION
Non-profit organizations should select board members based on the
likelihood that the board members will support the success of the
organization’s mission. Boards should not hide secret director
contributions behind feckless I.R.C. provisions that allow them to
withhold the identities of contributors. Instead, based on the findings of
this Study, the federal government should force organizations to disclose
the names of directors making contributions to organizations that exist
for public purposes and at public expense, and require them to certify that
quality governance is the first priority of the organization in selecting
persons to serve on their governing bodies.113 To do otherwise improperly
validates the decisions of organizations to accept money in exchange for
influence at the expense of their duties to stakeholders.

113. The IRS requires disclosure of governance related items (but does not yet require
the ones we suggest). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990
RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 19-25 (2021), https://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAL5-37PF].

